Season 15, Episode 18: The Pacific War, Part IV: The Tables Turn

With the neutralization of the base at Rabaul, Allied forces in the Pacific were in a favorable position to continue taking the initiative in the war against the empire of Japan. Within said empire, the reality of the progress of this war was starting to sink in. The people of Japan had been asked to endure incredible hardship in order to bring victory within reach. Millions had been drafted or reassigned as draftees to support the warmaking infrastructure of their nation. Their wages were depressed in the name of victory, their present lives interrupted for the sake of a better future. It was therefore of paramount importance that the common citizenry of Japan should be kept ignorant of the considerable misfortunes suffered by the Imperial Japanese Navy throughout the early 1940s, lest the all-too-frequent riots of the bygone Meiji and Taisho Periods make a serious comeback, potentially culminating in a revolution.

The 1938 State General Mobilization Law was amended in 1941 to completely abolish any remaining freedom of the press. Independent newspapers across the nation were forced to merge with their former competition and only print what was approved by government censors. Now the people of Japan would only know what their government wanted them to know. Periodicals nationwide, especially magazines, were told in clear terms that, as far as their readership was concerned, it was the unyielding desire of Japan’s many enemies to rule the world that had caused this war. Government censorship offices frequently passed along requests for periodicals to publish more anti-American and anti-British material. Any publication who did not want to be interrogated by Tokko thugs understood that these requests were orders in everything but name and most did as they were told.

This press censorship did not apply only to print media: the growing field of radio broadcast was similarly brought to heel by the imperial government. News programs were required to read official statements word for word and required to sometimes broadcast official speeches from Prime Minister Tojo Hideki or other high officials. Ironically, the most famous Japanese radio broadcaster was not broadcasting for a Japanese audience at all. Short-wave radios were banned in Japan because of their ability to intercept distant foreign broadcasts, but they were ubiquitous throughout southeast Asia. A regular broadcast on short-wave bands aimed at US and UK troops throughout the south Pacific was a show hosted by a Japanese woman who spoke English and sought to demoralize her audience. Although often remembered as “Tokyo Rose,” this was not a name used by any of the cadre of Japanese women who filled this role throughout the Pacific War. Tokyo Rose was a nickname chosen by the western press, who fretted over the propaganda efforts which were aimed at demoralization.

Thus, as the fortunes of the Pacific War turned against the Japanese, most of the Japanese civilian population remained ignorant of actual developments and probably believed their government’s accounts that things were going fine and that all their sacrifice would be worthwhile in the long run. As the eastern Solomon Islands fell under American control and the base at Rabaul was effectively isolated, Allied command in the Pacific pressed on toward their real eventual goal: the liberation of the Philippines. 

The residents of the Philippines, meanwhile, had not been idle in the face of Japanese occupation. Although the Philippine Military Academy had been officially dissolved during the early days of the Pacific War, many of its students took to the mountainous jungles found in the interior of Luzon, the Philippine archipelago’s large main island, and began engaging in guerrilla disruption after the surrender of US troops in May of 1942.

Around three hundred cadets who were still underclass men at the Military Academy were instructed by the school administration to return home because they were too young to contribute to any ongoing war effort. Instead, many formed a group called Hunters ROTC, which recruited like-minded Filipinos and engaged largely in civilian protection, as well as anti-Japanese propaganda and intelligence gathering. Joining with another group called Marking Guerrillas, they set about identifying their countrymen who were acting as spies for the Japanese and killed them.

Of course, not every insurgent group of rebel Filipinos stemmed from the pro-US spectrum. The People’s Army Against the Japanese was, as its name suggests, primarily formed by liberation-minded communists who sought to prevent the establishment of a Japanese-controlled Filipino puppet state similar to Manchukuo. The People’s Army boasted one especially high-profile member: movie star Carmen Rosales, a woman who trained as a sharpshooter and frequently accompanied guerrilla bands on various missions. She often wore a mustache to disguise both her sex and her identity. Obviously her involvement was not revealed until after the war had ended.

Although Carmen Rosales was among the most famous within the Filipino resistance, she was far from the only woman to take up arms against the invaders. While Filipino culture generally took its cues from the Spanish regarding a woman’s proper place - making a home, cooking meals, raising children - the drive to resist the Japanese proved far stronger than gender norms of the time. While women often served as capable intelligence agents, being so frequently ignored by the Japanese occupiers, they also served as officers within the Filipino resistance. While said resistance was made up of a diverse coalition of political views, these groups frequently worked together and coordinated their actions regardless of their differences. If you’d like to read more about the women of the Filipino resistance, I highly recommend the book “Pinay Guerrilleras,” which I’ll link in the description.

Resistance groups throughout the archipelago realized that their liberation was a long-term proposition, but they periodically established radio contact with Allied forces stationed throughout Australia and the South Pacific, often passing along vital intelligence. Meanwhile, the Allied forces in the Pacific focused on retaking the Aleutian Islands in Alaska where the Japanese defenders had been desperately trying to muster sufficient forces to threaten the US west coast.

Throughout the late summer and fall of 1942, the Army air corps had been launching regular bombing raids against air strips and Japanese aircraft on the Aleutian Islands. These raids were so successful that on any given day in late 1942, the number of aircraft available to the Japanese on the Aleutians was usually less than 14. What the Japanese forces in Alaska needed were carriers which could counter these raids, but after the Battle of Midway, Japanese carriers were in extremely short supply. The occupation of the Aleutians was, you might recall, not given top priority by Japanese high command, who had focused their efforts on winning one big, decisive naval battle against the Allies.

In February of 1943, American forces set up an airstrip on the island of Amchitka, near the Japanese occupied islands, which allowed for more frequent bombing raids which targeted nearly all visible infrastructure on the occupied islands, including radar, anti-aircraft batteries, railways, anchored naval vessels, and supply depots. This destructive harassment prevented the Imperial troops from developing these islands into fully-capable air bases and an Allied naval blockade also put them into a supply pinch. In April, a convoy of transport ships and armed escort vessels attempted to run the blockade, but was soundly defeated in the ensuing battle.

Three months later, US troops attempted to retake the Island of Attu and met with stiff resistance from Japanese defenders. While Japanese forces had been plagued by supply shortages, the harsh northern environment of the Aleutian Islands proved challenging for Allied forces as well and they dealt with equipment failure, a lack of adequate outerwear, and a shortage of landing craft. Japanese troops, meanwhile, dug in on the high ground inland, which forced their enemies on a long march through freezing conditions before finally facing an entrenched foe. Frostbite and other health hazards from the sub-zero conditions were widespread.

Allied troops forced the Japanese occupiers to retreat, but at great cost to their own numbers. Over five hundred were killed storming Japanese positions and more than twice that were wounded and even more suffered from injuries related to the extreme cold conditions. At the end of May, the Japanese on the island of Attu were nearly defeated and they organized one final surprise charge against Allied positions, which proved so successful that some Japanese troops engaged with Allied forces in the rear. However, the casualties suffered by the Imperial troops on Attu were significant, and at the end of the Allied campaign to retake the island, only twenty-eight survived to be taken prisoner.

Japanese troops on the remaining Aleutian islands were evacuated in secret during the later summer months of 1943 and those islands were retaken by Allied troops, with the only casualties suffered being victims of leftover booby traps and the occasional friendly-fire incident. The effort which the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy expended in seizing the Aleutian Islands back in June of 1942, while not entirely free of casualties, had never been a top priority for Japanese high command. Had the Imperial Navy managed to triumph at the Battle of Midway, the islands could have served as a useful base for supporting a land invasion of the US west coast but instead they had become little more than another liability for the badly overstretched Imperial Military, which was becoming too desperate to defend their colonies in the south Pacific from the ongoing US offensive to bother trying to support a more robust defense of some islands off the coast of Alaska.

While retaking the Aleutian islands helped to calm continued fears of a Japanese assault on the west coast of the United States, the Japanese effort to seize those islands in the first place resulted in a new source of critical intelligence for US forces. During that initial incursion in early June of 1942, a Japanese fighter plane - specifically a Mitsubishi A6M Zero - had crash landed on Akutan Island. The pilot was killed on impact but his vessel remained fairly intact, save for a few holes courtesy of US troops defending the Aleutians. About a month after it had crashed, it was discovered by US Naval forces, who carefully transported it to San Diego, where it was repaired and, more importantly, analyzed by US intelligence.

Some of the discoveries surrounding the so-called Akutan Zero served merely as confirmation of previously recovered aircraft. However, with a fully intact Zero which was returned to airworthy status, US intelligence was able to make a bevy of new observations about the craft which would help in their continuing efforts to obtain any available advantage over Japanese pilots. Okumiya Masatake, an aviator who served in the Imperial Japanese Navy who later became a historian, described the acquisition of the Akutan Zero as being at least as consequential as the Battle of Midway. As US intelligence and their aviators unraveled the limitations, capabilities, and weaknesses of the Mitsubishi A6M Zero, those discoveries percolated throughout the air corps of both the Navy and Army, whose pilots would be better able to successfully engage with their Japanese counterparts.

Meanwhile, in China, several large concentrations of the Imperial Japanese Army attacked Chinese positions in western Hubei Province in early summer of 1943. After a few initial offensive victories, Japanese troops became pinned down in difficult terrain and faced renewed vigor from their enemies. During a desperate final push, Chinese defenders successfully held their ground against ten successive mass charges. Japanese troops withdrew to their previous positions and both US and Chinese media declared that the Battle of West Hubei resulted in a major victory against Imperial aggression. However, most modern assessments assert that this was more of a tactical draw and note that although the Japanese did quit the field first, Chinese troops did not attempt any pursuit.

On the other end of the country, Allied troops prepared to retake Japanese-held portions of Burma and Yunnan Province with the objective of reestablishing a supply line between India and China. This would be a costly and difficult endeavor and would only be resolved after a year and a half. The new offensive required the Imperial Japanese Army to continue pouring resources into defending their hold over northern Burma and portions of Yunnan Province, stretching their already-overtaxed supply lines dangerously thin.

Hoping to support their defense of northern Burma and Yunnan, the Imperial Japanese Army launched a major offensive targeting the city of Changde. The primary aim was to prevent Japanese troops in Burma from becoming pincered by Allied troops on the western front and Chinese troops to their east. However, the city was well-defended and capturing it would prove difficult. Changde and its environs had been on the Imperial military’s radar for quite some time. After the war’s end, it was revealed that Japanese forces had been attempting to inundate the area with biological weapons like plague bacteria since 1941. To maximize their advantage in the coming offensive, they relied heavily on targeted chemical weapon strikes in order to clear densely-defended segments of the city.

The initial strike on Changde nevertheless met with stiff resistance from KMT defenders, who successfully held back the Japanese offensive for eleven days in spite of being outnumbered by about three to one. However, thanks to the vital assistance of local collaborators, Japanese troops successfully seized total control of Changde on December 6. However, the exhausted Japanese armies soon found themselves targeted by a renewed Chinese counteroffensive which orchestrated a one-two punch of breaking through Japanese defensive lines while simultaneously severing their supply. Cut off, demoralized, and beleaguered by repeated incursions, the Japanese armies withdrew from Changde on December 13 and were harried by Chinese pursuers until January 5, when the last surviving Japanese troops reached friendly defensive lines.

The Battle of Changde was hailed as a Chinese victory and was pretty clearly a defeat for the Imperial Japanese Army, whose use of chemical weapons no longer sufficed as a means of winning long-term strategic victories. As 1943 came to a close and 1944 began, the Empire of Japan was pretty clearly on the defensive in nearly every area of the Pacific and East Asian theaters.

Meanwhile, in Europe, the Eastern Front became bogged down with fighting as the Axis powers tried to recover their momentum. Soviet forces had successfully halted their advance into Russia and attempted to seize the initiative throughout 1943 and start forcing the enemy back. While the Red Army would not be successful in every offensive they attempted throughout 1943, their efforts did manage to prevent the Axis powers from seizing control of the oil fields in the Caucasus mountains, a devastating blow to the supply lines of Nazi Germany and her allies, who were already reckoning with shortages.

Having lost control of Kharkov, Kursk, and Rostov in February of 1943, the German army was desperate to launch a new successful offensive which would accomplish the objectives set forth in Operation Barbarossa. The spring season of 1943 brought a brief halt to military activities on the Eastern Front due to the muddy conditions brought on by the thaw of winter. It became difficult and, in some places, outright impossible to transport heavy armor. However, as summer dawned and the wet conditions abated, the German army prepared to once more take the fight to their Soviet enemies in what would become the largest tank battle in world history.

The German attack plan was dubbed “Operation Citadel,” and it proposed a two-pronged offensive to the north and south of the city of Kursk. The two prongs would encircle the five Soviet armies stationed in the Kursk area and subsequently destroy them, winning Kursk and allowing for further incursions into Soviet territory. However, there was some disagreement among German high command regarding this operation. Some believed that waiting for fresh reconnaissance to discover gaps in the Soviet line which could be exploited through rapid armored advance would be a better approach, one which was more likely to result in significant victories. However, Hitler favored a late spring offensive, so that was that. While Operation Citadel was initially planned to launch in early May, it was delayed for two months while fresh tank reinforcements arrived from Germany.

While this delay helped shore up Germany’s armored divisions in the east with fresh strength, it also allowed the Soviets extra time to gather intelligence and discover their enemy’s objective. While Stalin initially wanted to counter this operation with a pre-emptive Soviet offensive, Zhukov convinced him that it would be better to wait for the German offensive and use their foreknowledge to gain a victory. Kursk was thus fortified in the meantime as the Soviets awaited the German advance.

Another significant factor which would help tip the scales in the coming Battle of Kursk was the activities of pro-Soviet guerrilla forces in occupied eastern Europe who sabotaged German supplies and communications infrastructure. There is some irony to the Soviet partisan guerrillas who wreaked havoc on Nazi supply lines; life under the Soviet Union had become, for many eastern Europeans, a constant stream of misery thanks to the horrific famine of the early 1930s followed by the political purges of the later 1930s. If the German occupiers had done more to ingratiate themselves among the Ukrainians, Belorussians, and various Baltic ethnicities whose lands they were occupying, it is entirely possible that large numbers of these peoples would have joined them in their anti-Soviet crusade. However, the primary driving force behind National Socialism was Racist Chauvinism which proclaimed the superiority of the so-called Aryan races like the Germans over supposedly inferior groups like Jews, Romani, and also Slavs. As hard as life had been for these groups under Soviet oppression, it had gotten measurably worse under the Germans, who gleefully engaged in mass theft, mass murder, and mass enslavement of eastern Europeans in the name of establishing racial hierarchy. The Soviet Union was, for most of them, clearly the better option.

The destruction of hundreds of trains, railways, and bridges behind German lines helped to delay Operation Citadel and gave the Soviets more time to prepare a devastating response. On July 4, 1943, the Germans once again crossed into Soviet-controlled territory as their southern army group advanced toward Kursk. However, this would not be a repeat of the massive land grab that resulted from Operation Barbarossa. While German troops captured many outlying villages south of Kursk, dozens of tanks were lost thanks to the minefields established by Kursk’s defenders. Casualties among the German infantry were also excessively high as Soviet defenders put up a stiff and determined resistance. These casualties were not easy for the Germans to bear-- they were still grossly outnumbered in terms of total strength of armed forces versus the Soviet Red Army, who possessed around two thousand more tanks than the Germans could field.

Nevertheless, there was something to be said for the superiority of the German tanks. Commonly referred to as “Tiger Tanks,” these vehicles were built with very thick armor which often proved difficult for enemy forces to overcome. Coordination of German tank crews meant that their tank offensives were especially devastating to defenders. When the northern German army group began its advance on Kursk the day after the southern group launched, there was one engagement with Soviet tanks which resulted in a loss of forty tanks for the Soviets but only seven for the Germans. Nevertheless, the advance in the north was, just like in the south, greatly slowed by anti-tank fortifications and the stiff defense of Red Army troops.

About a week after the initial incursion, a German army in the southern group managed to break through Soviet defensive lines after heavily utilizing air strikes from the Luftwaffe, which destroyed dozens of Soviet tanks. A few days later, the Soviets attempted a tank-based counter-offensive near the village of Prokhorovkha, which was facing off against a German tank offensive. The Soviets absolutely got the worst of the fighting during the Battle of Prokhorovkha, losing over three hundred tanks and over three thousand personnel, compared to the loss of eighty tanks and eight hundred personnel by the Germans. However, at the end of the battle it was the Germans who withdrew, being far less able to absorb such losses than their opponents.

The Soviets followed up their success at Prokhorovkha with a renewed offensive against the northern German army group which successfully pushed them back. Already suffering from supply shortages and communication difficulties thanks to guerrilla actions behind their lines, the German army on the Eastern Front was also troubled by some new developments in other nearby theaters which encouraged the third Reich to adopt a defensive posture. In North Africa, Allied tank operations had successfully pushed Axis armies out of their local strongholds in May of 1943. This success was followed up by an Allied invasion of Sicily in July of 1943, just a few days after the beginning of Operation Citadel.

If Italy fell, Germany’s southern flank would be exposed to invasion. As the Soviet Red Army gradually pushed German forces out of the Kursk area throughout the summer of 1943, it appeared to most observers that the primary Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan were on the ropes. Just a few years before they had appeared nearly invincible, or at least undefeatable in battle. Now they seemed to have found the limit of their strength, just as their enemies were finding their stride in the ongoing conflict.

Meanwhile, in Japan, the premiership of Tojo Hideki was leading the empire straight into disaster. In May of 1942, before the battle of Midway, Prime Minister Tojo had given his approval to a list of demands which would be offered to the Allied powers as a set of conditions under which Japan would cease making war upon them. Essentially these demands boiled down to Japan being permitted to keep all the territory which they had thus far conquered and included diplomatic recognition for their puppet state of Manchukuo and their puppet government of China in Nanjing. It further demanded that the empire of Japan be granted possession of several South American nations as well as Alaska and the State of Washington. This was not a renewed attempt at good-faith diplomacy, but was presented as non-negotiable items which the Americans and British would have to accept if they wanted peace.

By the fall of 1943, even Prime Minister Tojo was not delusional enough to believe that Japan still had much of a chance of forcing the big decisive victory against the Allies which the Imperial Military had repeatedly sought. He and the emperor agreed, that September, that the Imperial armed forces should adopt a strong defensive posture in southeast Asia in hopes of finding some way to turn the tide. In the meantime, he approved a fresh plan for a renewed offensive against China which was set to begin the next year.

As the Second World War raged onward throughout 1943, the Axis Powers found themselves pushed back and were growing increasingly desperate to find some way to turn the tables. As that year approached its end, however, an Allied battlefield victory would have an unexpected effect on the American populace which Prime Minister Tojo hoped he might use to bring this terrible war to an end on terms which would be favorable to the empire of Japan. Next time, we will discuss the Battle of Tarawa, as well as the Allied efforts to drive Japanese troops out of the Philippines.