Welcome to The History Guy podcast Counterfactuals.

What is a counterfactual in the context of studying history.

It is a kind of analysis where we examined what might have happened had historical events gone differently as a thought experiment.

The goal is to learn and understand history as it is by talking about what it could have been as a twist on the historical stories that we tell on the History Guy YouTube channel.

This is a series of podcasts that dwell on that eternal question what if.

I'm Josh, a writer for the YouTube channel and son of the History Guy.

If you're a fan of the channel, you already know Lance the History Guy himself.

To liven up our discussions on what might have happened, we have invited Brad wagnan history officionado and a longtime friend of The History Guy, to join us.

Remember that if you'd like to support us, you can find us on Patreon, YouTube and locals dot com.

Join us as we discuss what deserves to be remembered and what might have been.

Today.

We talk about a little remembered battle that could have been a turning points in the First World War, a battle between the German High Seas fleets and the Russian Baltic Fleets in the Gulf of Riga.

Without further ado, let me introduce the history guy well.

The contest between the Royal Navy and the Imperial German Navy, and particularly the new technology of the submarine, tends to dominate any discussion of the naval component.

Of the Great War.

That was not the only naval contest out there in the Baltic The ships of the German High Seas Fleet faced off against the ships of the Imperial Russian Navy, and in August nineteen fifteen, the High Seas Fleets sought to eliminate the Russian Navy's Baltic Fleet and a little remembered battle that was far more important than you might have realized.

The nineteen fifteen Battle of the Gulf of Riga deserves to be remembered.

The naval war in the bal Tak is not one of the more discussed theaters of the Great War, but it was actually quite an interesting theater with different challenges than almost any other.

After the unification of Germany in eighteen seventy one, the entire southern coast of the Baltic was German.

Has made defense of the Baltic and its coastline critical to the empire, whose The entire northern border of the German Empire was vulnerable to naval bombardment or invasion from the Baltic, but defense of that coastline was even more important because of trade with Sweden.

Sweden was neutral, treading with both sides, but the trade with Germany across the Baltak was particularly important, and Sweden was Imperial Germany's largest source of iron ore.

The German war industry was entirely dependent upon these imports, without which the Germans would not have been able to prosecute the war effort.

If the Allies could effectively blockade Germany in the Baltic, the Empire could not have lasted through nineteen fifteen, but the Allies proved un to do that.

Despite the fact that at the outset of war in nineteen fourteen, the British Royal Navy included more than three times the total tonnage of the Imperial German navy, the Allies faced unique challenges in the Baltic due to its geography.

Well, the Baltic Sea is an arm of the Atlantic Ocean, it is essentially an inland sea.

An article in the spring twenty eighteen edition of the Naval War College Review notes that in terms of operating environment, the Baltic Sea is challenging for maritime forces.

Much of it is shallow in depth and access to the region is controlled by narrow inlets such as the Danish Straits.

Between eighteen eighty seven and eighteen ninety five, the Germans have built a canal through the German state of Schleswig Holsting that connected the North Sea to the Baltic Between nineteen oh seven and nineteen fourteen, had widened and deepened the canal to make it large enough for dreadnoughts, the largest warships of the day, to pass through.

This meant that Germany controlled the passage that allowed ships of its high seas fleet in the North Sea to quickly move to the Baltic Sea.

The only path for the Royal Navy, however, was through the straits around Denmark.

Like Sweden, Denmark remained neutral throughout the war.

As a neutral stay at the Rules of War said that they had to leave their waters open for navigation, but they weren't.

They were mined.

This is because Germany demanded that Denmark mine the straits specifically to prevent the Royal Navy from blockading Germany in the Baltic, Denmark mine the Straits themselves, afraid that if they did not, Germany would use the mining of the Straits as an excuse to invade.

The United Kingdom wanted to support Danish neutrality, and so tacitly allowed the Straits to be mined.

This meant that the British Grand Fleet was largely cut off from the Baltic Thus, the Imperial Navy was able to dominate the Baltic, but at a cost, since sending ships to the Baltic meant taking them away from the North Sea.

But the admirals of the German Heisey's fleet generally saw countering the British Grand Fleet in the North Sea to be the priority.

In his nineteen thirty seven Naval History of the Great War, Bernard Halpern writes the inherent mobility of sea power enabled to Germans to establish unchallenged superiority in the Baltic anytime they cared to detach sufficient forces from the North Sea to do so.

It isn't that the Royal Navy was cut off from the Baltic Sea entirely well, it would have been a great risk to try to send surface ships through the Denmark Straits, submarines could slip through.

While the submarine war is usually seen through the lens of the German U boats in the Battle of the Atlantic, the Baltic was another story.

Al Katian website for educator's explains during World War One, while the U boats of the Imperial German Navy prowled the North Atlantic in an effort to blockade imports distant for Britain, British submarines on a smaller scale, so fear in the Baltic Sea an interrupted surface vessel traffic there, but there was another naval force to contend with in the Baltic Aside from the southern coast controlled by Germany and Sweetened to the north, the Baltic was Russian.

Prior to nineteen seventeen, what today we think of as the Baltic states of Lithuania and Latvia were part of the Russian Empire.

Finland was a Grand duchy that, although technically part of the Empire, retained a significant degree of autonomy, including exclusion from the draft.

While Finland essentially operated as a neutral country, Russian forces, particularly naval forces still had use of the territory.

Perhaps most importantly to Russia, the Russian capital of Petrograd was on the Gulf of Finland.

Like Imperial Germany, defending the Baltic coast meant for Russia defense of the homeland.

Halprin explains the Russians were a land power of great importance in the European balance of power.

Their strength to sea was nowhere near their strength on land, but their potential was significant.

The Imperial Russian Navy had been devastated during the nineteen oh four oh five Russo Japanese War, following from the third largest navy in the world to the sixth largest.

Reconstruction had been difficult, and Imperial Russia faced a particular naval challenge.

Sleet had to be divided between the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Pacific, three areas so separated that mutual support was impossible.

Notes that they could realistically helpe to dominate the Black Sea, they had little hope of matching the German fleet ship for ship in the Baltic.

Thus, he argues, the big question was how much of the German fleet they might divert to the Baltic from its position facing the British in the North Sea.

The Imperial Russian Navy in the Baltic was substantial, including five pre dreadnought battleships, with three newer dreadnought battleships under constructions was as ten cruisers, twenty one destroyers in forty eight torpedo boats.

The Russian Navy faced, however, many challenges, including logistics, but halpronotes.

The most difficult challenge was with personnel.

Foreign observers were frequently critical of the attitude of the Russian Naval officer Corps, although the corps must have faced special difficulties turning generally illiterate inland conscripts into seamen, particularly with the long northern winters hampering training.

Thus, the naval contests in the Baltic became a strategy of defense.

Both sides depended upon large minefields and coastal fortifications, the Germans to discourage any offensive action by the Russian fleet, and the Russians to protect the Gulfs of Finland and Riga from attack by the Germans.

The Germans could choose to create a dominant naval force in the Baltic at any time, but only by weapening their fleet.

In the North Sea, actions tended to center around small ships, while Alcacian notes the mighty capital ship sat like chess pieces.

Each side struck blows occasionally, but the fleets largely stayed away from each other.

But the Naval War and the Baltic saw a change in the summer of nineteen fifteen.

While the Great War in the West took place largely in France and Belgium, the Eastern Front stretched some eight hundred miles from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

Halprin notes that the First World War on the Eastern Front was far different than the picture most people have derived from the more familiar fighting in the West.

Rather than the static War in the West, the War in the East was largely fought over huge expanses of open ground and was much more fluid.

Russia had found some initial success and a massive invasion of East Prussia in August of nineteen fourteen, an attack they had promised their French allies in order to drop theirman troops away from the West, but attacks by the Central Powers had thrown the Russians on the defensive in nineteen fifteen, leading to what was called the Russian Great retreatin describes the situation of the ground war in the Baltic Corland in the Baltic represented the extreme left flank of the German line.

The area consisted to a large extent of barren wastes, and when the German offensive began in April, the front lines were made up of block posts at ten mile intervals.

Roads and communications were poor, and the Germans have few troops to spare for the area.

The German forces represented approximately five and a half infantry in seven and a half cavalry divisions, and the Russians retreated steadily under German pressure.

The Germans occupied Bindau in Lafia on eighteen July, and the advance did not stop until the Russians established a strong line before Riga.

Suddenly, a land battle that was on the fringe to the front, where the largest battles were ringing fought far to the south, was threatening Riga, today the capital of Latvia.

In nineteen fifteen, Rigo was an important industrial port city of the Russian Empire.

Moreover, the line along the Delgava River south of Riga represented the end of the Great retreat.

The German army broke the line the road to Moscow would be left open and Imperial Russia might be knocked out of the war.

Halpern rites at the Gulf of Riga was steadily becoming a focal point of naval activity as the German army advanced in Portland and naval operations on the flanks of the army grew in importance.

The defense of Riga thus largely hinged on Russian naval control of the Gulf of Riga, which allowed Russian ships to threaten the German flank and to prevent the Germans from landing troops protected by mines in coastal defenses.

The Russian Baltic fleet and the Gulf of Riga, including poor gunboats shouscheller draft, facilitated support of the seaward flank of the army.

A mine layer, six submarines, twenty five destroyers and torpedo boats.

A seaplane carrier with four aircraft and the old pre dreadnought battleship Slava had significant advantages.

Halper and rights the Germans might have control in the Baltic the Russian Navy could have claimed control of the Gulf of Riga.

The Germans found it difficult to bring their superior force to bear there, and the Russians proved to be difficult to dislodge.

Thus, in early August nineteen fifteen, the Germans set a significant group with the High Seas Fleet into the Baltic with the gold of destroying the Russian naval presence in the Gulf of Riga and potentially drawing what was left of the Russian fleet into the Baltic from the Gulf of Finland.

They could defeat the Russian navy and supported their land campaign, Germany might be able to knock Russia out of the war.

The German fleet, under the command of Admiral Friends von Hipper, included eight dreadnoughts, three battle cruisers, five light cruisers and thirty one destroyers.

The Battle of the Gulf of Riga began on August eighth.

While much of the German fleet would stay in the Baltic to defend against any attack by the rest of the Russian fleet, two pre dreadnought battleships would support a group of minesweepers who were to open the channel into the gulf.

This would allow the German battleships and battle cruisers to enter the gulf and destroy the Russian vessels there so whilst to mind the strait of Moon Sound, preventing reinforcements from coming from the Gulf of Finland.

But the attack didn't go as planned.

The Russians, including the twelve inch guns of the Slava, harassed the mine sweepers.

The German battleships drove the Slava back, but continued to attack.

Some smaller craft and aircraft continued.

The resistance meant that the mine sweeping took more time than intended, and it became clear that the Germans would not be able to enter the gulf before nightfall.

As it was to be a moonless night.

It was clear that the deutsch Land, the mine layer intended to mind the moon Sound, would not be able to proceed at night.

Lay meant that the German attack couldn't proceed.

Vice Admiral Erhart Schmidt, in charge of the attack, was in a difficult position.

Many of his smaller torpedo crafts were low on coal and would have to withdraw, leaving his ships vulnerable to attack from submarines.

The mines determined resistance of the greatly outnumbered Russian fleet and threat of submarines had defeated the superior German force, which was forced to withdraw.

Schmidt tried again on the eighteenth, this time with the support of the newer dreadnaughs Pawsen and Nassau, which had much better underwater protection in case of attack by mines or submarines.

On this attack, planned much more time for minesweeping.

Again, the Russians put up a stout defense and a German minesweeper and destroyer were lost in the first day.

Schmid sent two destroyers in the gulf to attempt at night attack on Slava, but they were unable to reach the battleship and instead they found themselves in a clash with Russian destroyers, and one of the German destroyers was set on fire and then struck a mine and sank as it attempted to retreat.

A duel the next day between Passen and Nassau and the Slava resulted in three hits on the Russian battleship, forcing it to withdraw.

The Germans managed to breach the minefield, but another destroyer was lost when it struck a mine.

Once in the gulf, Schmidt became concerned about the threat from submarines and acutely aware that his larger vessels had little ability to maneuver in the gulf.

He was also aware that he had lost the advantage of surprise and that mining Moon Sound would only delay any Russian force coming from the Gulf of Finland.

The moment had passed and he decided to retreat.

In the Baltic the British submarine E one struck the battlecruiser Maultkey with the torpedo.

The MOLTKEI benefited from a stroke of good luck as the torpedo entered Molky's bow torpedo room, but none of moulkes torpedoes detonated.

The British at first reported the Mulkey sunk, although the ship survived and was repaired.

Having taken several losses and under the threat of submarines, Hipper decided to withdraw back to the North Sea.

The Battle of the Gulf of Riga included a few long range duels between battleships, some hot destroyer actions, and the ever present threat of mines and submarines.

The combination of the geography of the Baltic Sea and Gulf of Riga and a determined resistance by an outnumbered Russian fleet outlasted a substantially larger German fleet that was unwilling to sustain major losses.

The Germans claimed victory, having proven their ability to penetrate the Russian defenses, but the Allies claimed that they had won a significant naval battle, sinking several German ships for light losses of their own.

The little remembered nineteen fifteen naval Battle of the Gulf of Riga wasn't a large naval battle.

No capital ships were sunk, and yet it was significant.

Had the Germans defeated the Russian navy and taken control of the Gulf of Riga, then the Russian Army's position south of Riga would have been untenable would have been flanked.

But with the withdrawal of the German fleet, the Germans lost their chance of taking Riga by land.

When German troops tried to land by barge on August twentieth, they were driven off by Russian gunboats.

Rigo wouldn't fall for another two years, and when it finally did in the September nineteen seventeen Battle of Riga, it represented the near final collapse of the Russian Army.

The road left open to Moscow.

It helped to spur the October Revolution, which raises an interesting question.

If the Russian navy had not held off in the nineteen fifteen Battle of Riga, then might the German army have broken the Russian army and forced Russia out of.

The war two years earlier?

And if that had happened, might that have changed the outcome of the war?

Now for the fun part, where I the history guy himself and longtime friends of the history guy Brad Wagnen discussed what might have happened if it all went different.

I really liked this episode because it talks about a couple of things that I feel like you're kind often ignored.

And it's not just that World War One, I think is much less well known in the public mind as well World War Two.

But you know, when we talk about World War One, we tend to say that there wasn't much of a naval war, and this one talks about a piece of that naval war that at least very could have been very important.

And then it also, you know, we think of the World War One, especially in the West, we think of the trench warfare and fighting in the Western Front, and we don't talk a lot about the Eastern Front fighting, which was which was very different and I think very important to the outcome of the war.

It was and it was different than it was in the Second World War.

Yeah, I mean I have a degree in history, and I think that we talked more about the the gallivanting around down in Southeast Africa we did the Eastern Front.

I mean I didknew know almost nothing about the Russian Front in the First World War.

This one was a very fun one to research.

Yeah.

Yeah, all you really talk about with the with the Russian Front in the First World War is they you know, they stopped fighting in nineteen seventeen, and that was that was a problem, you know, that could have what could have happened if if the Americans hadn't been there to kind of shore up as the Germans were bringing soldiers around And ultimately, I mean that's that's kind of what this episode gets to be about when we talk about counterfactionals, because what if, as as near as that was, what if the Germans were able to move those soldiers from the Eastern Front earlier?

Yeah, I mean that's the fundamental question there.

So I mean, who even ever thought about the First World War naval battle between the high seast Fleet and the and the Imperial fleet.

I mean, I mean even even to the extent you hear about the naval war, it's all about the grand fleet in the high seast fleet.

No one.

You don't even think about Russians having a fleet of course after the Russo Japanese war, so I mean to an extent, you know, they were just belieingfully.

So it turned and it turns out to be you know, quite important because it defends Riga.

And it was that fall of the fall of Riga that really caused the fall of the czar two years later, and so what if what if it had fallen earlier?

It really does lead to a number of interesting counterfactuals, and it is it's just it's a piece of the war.

It's a turning point that you might not ever have thought about.

And you know, again it's a it's a lesser known war, and it's a lesser known part of a lesser known front on a lesser war.

And that, you know, that makes it interesting.

That's the stuff we want to do in the.

History guy, just to reiterate, let's face of how many you know, how many people understand exactly what the Russians were doing during the First World War, even before the battle.

There are so many different moments when the Russian Army, if they had been a little bit better commanded, might have taken East Prussia and threatened Berlin in nineteen fourteen if they had not had the successes that they did initially against the Austro Hungarians.

It is possible that German troops might not have been pulled off the Western Front and sent to the Eastern Front at a time when the German offensive was beginning to stall out, and removing a couple hundred thousand men at a crucial moment.

So yeah, these are definitely these are definitely events.

They aren't covered.

I'm with you, Lance, all of the history courses that I took on Central Eastern Europe and World War One and World War Two.

Definitely, you know, the focus is on the Western Front and in the Eastern Front it's very very low.

Coverage and it's fun.

I mean, there are ships of the are are so steampoky, it's really kind of an interesting thing to study.

The battle itself is quite interesting, but it's a side to front you that you don't necessarily know.

It leads to lots of different questions, with the most obvious being if the if the fleet had been defeated, then that they wouldn't have been able to stop the invasion that the Germans had planned.

And there's a possibility that the loss that essentially was the one that threw them over the edge of nineteen seventeen, then that comes in nineteen fifteen, and so that, you know, the first question is is it really possible that had this naval engagement or this series of naval engagements gone differently, that Russia could have been knocked out of the war in nineteen fifteen.

That is the I mean, that's the crux of the question.

And the real thing I think is that maybe not you know, this sole battle.

But the thing is, if they lose this battle and then they lose Riga, We're not just talking you know, does the kingdom immediately collapse.

We're talking about the consequences of losing Riga, because they're going to the Russians are going to have to continue to fall back.

And this is as I mean, they've fallen back essentially, you know, this is following it was.

Literally called the Great Fallback, the Great retreat, and prices are going up in Russia, I mean, the skyrocket.

The Czar seems to be completely clueless about people's dissatisfaction, and so I mean, I think that it's legit to say here that maybe this that already, with the losses that were occurring, that already the kingdom is teetering, and if.

They afford that major loss and whatever might come after it, because it's not like I mean, they were still hundreds of kilometers away from from Petrograd and from Moscow, both which were very important.

It's not like the Germans would have necessarily for sure taken them by taking Riga, but they for sure would have taken more than just Riga, and Riga was important and control of the Baltic Sea was important.

If they lost control of the Baltic Sea, you know that that essentially makes it difficult for them to supply much of their army.

They lose a lot of supply and they lose.

So I mean that the question there's is would the would the Russian public where they sow on the edge, because they were clearly already you know, rattling, they sow on the edge that another loss could have been, you know, the critical loss that threw them into some sort of revolt or thrown the Czar into a position where he had to negotiate peace with the Germans in order to find security at home.

And so so, I mean, so so one is what if it causes the Russian Revolution to occur two years earlier?

One is what if it allows the Czar to get out of World War One and to prevent the Russian Revolution?

Those both would have profound effects into the into the next century.

They pull out or if they're knocked out of the war in nineteen fifteen, does that by giving two more years to defeat the Western Allies with those divisions before America came into the war?

Does Germany win the First World War?

Does it prolong the First World War?

Does it allow them to defeat one of the one are the two major revels on the on the Western Front?

And what does that all mean?

I mean, I think when you see, you see very quickly that it has profound impacts for the rest of the twenties century.

I mean, if you prevent the Russian Revolution, if you expedite the Russian Revolution, those alone, you know, totally transformed history.

And I don't think it's all that much of a stretch here to say this naval battle, because this is really what prevented another major land defeat, that this naval battle might have been a very key turning point keeping Russia in the war for another two years, which might have been a very key turning point for the actual outcome of the First World War.

I think, based on just my understanding of what was going on in the region that if Russia is out of the war relatively early, I think that actually the star survives for another period of you know, several years, because the Russian Revolution really was the frustration that was caused by three years of total war for an economy that really wasn't prepared for it, and for the typical Soviet style of warfare, which throughout the ages has been well, keep throwing people at the problem and eventually they will overcome whatever is in their way.

And yeah, this was a situation on the on the Eastern Front.

There were a couple of times where General Winter also saved the Russians by causing Usro Hungarian offensives with German troops to slow down at a crucial time, and it worked, you know, worked against them as well.

So it was definitely definitely we see Russia at war in much the same way in certain in certain ways as we have seen since the Napoleonic era.

And that is the you know, the Russians have always been a land of power, and they have always depended very heavily on the quantity of their troops.

But you know, nineteen fifteen, the the real difference is that the Bolsheviks didn't have the organization and the public support kind of you know, into that vacuum that they needed.

And I honestly wonder even if it didn't cause the collapse, you know, in nineteen fifteen, if that waits until honestly, I wonder even six months or a year earlier.

So instead of nineteen, you know, October of nineteen seventeen, if we're talking October of nineteen sixteen, what does that mean.

For the war?

And honestly, I think I think it impacts how we're I mean, who comes into power, Because if say the provisional government or reversion of the provisional government, instead of choosing to try to honor the commitments they'd made to the other Western powers, does choose to halt the war effort, that would be that might be enough to keep the Bolsheviks from power.

I worked, it was a near thing on the Western front.

If the Germans are able to move that, you know, they're large attack.

They're large offensive in the spring.

If they're able to push that back even a few months, we might be talking a more significant attack.

And even if they don't, you know, totally break through and collapse the Western allies, that might impact how.

In nineteen eighteen the I mean, it's kind of well accepted that they had to rush these offensives because they were desperate to end the war before America entered the war.

And it's also true that they felt like that, I mean, they had to bring America into the war by moving to unrestricted warfare in the hope that they could very quickly defeat those two allies.

A lot of that time pressure goes away if there's if you're talking just another three or six months without concern of America entering the war.

I mean, America got there much quicker than they thought they could, right, So they were under the impression that would take America a year to mobilize.

America had troops coming more quickly than that.

But you know, on the other hand, if Russia's knocked out in nineteen fifteen.

You know, maybe that, but you know, maybe Wilson really wants to be there anyway.

Maybe he's only opposing war because it's a public thing.

Maybe a disaster for the Allies would bring American into the ward more quickly.

But here's one.

Nineteen fifteen, the wars really just started, right.

The reason for the war really was the von Schliefhan planned the idea that with Russia mobilized and enemies on both sides, that Germany had to defeat both those enemies in detail.

So let's say in nineteen fifteen, the Russian fleet loses, they were able to land troops, they take Riga, the Czar sues for peace.

Is it possible that Germany sues for peace with France in Britain in the First World War last eight months?

Yep, the troops are home by Christmas of nineteen fifteen.

Yeah, like everybody thought it was going to be.

How different is the twentieth century If the First World War only lasts a few months before Russia's knocked out and Germany says we don't have to fight anymore.

The first thing that comes to mind, quite honestly, is that World War two doesn't happen, certainly not in the way that it happened in real life.

I mean, we're talking almost all of the causes of World War Two stem somehow from issues that began in World War One.

How does the Nazis don't come into power if the Russian or if the German Kingdom, you know, if they're still in power, Kaiser is still in power, we don't have that, we don't have the depression and the and that's I mean, that's that alone is crazy.

But it also I think means, I mean, if we last eight months, that means Austria, Hungary and the Ottoman Empire survive at least longer than they did ultimately.

Ultimately, I don't think, I mean, that wouldn't really address the root causes of you know, why those the Habsburgs are falling, and why the nationalism and among the Arabs and stuff.

But well, in the Ottoman state, I mean, the Ottomans were already with the sixth man of the euro If they were saying that, that's that's actually the fly in the ointment on that on the whole theory is that First World War was largely thought of her territorial interest in territorial gains in the Balkans.

If Germany decides to stop fighting, Austro Hungary still has its reason to keep fighting Serbia, right, which are just transparently reasons to try to you know, claim territory from the Ottomans.

So is it possible that the Western Allies and Germany come to an agreement in Austria Hungary and then all the Balkans, the Albanians, the Montenegrins, all those people that fought and just slaughtered each other for a long time keep fighting between essentially a war between the Ottomans and the Austro Hungarians over So it could be not that there's not a First World War, but that there's a very different First World War.

And that is another So I think if if the First World War is much shorter, if all the people are, you maybe avoid the Great Depression and you certainly avoid the instances that were leading to the Second World War.

Or you know, maybe you start the you know, the armstraates that's going to lead eventually into the into the Second World War anyway, I mean, maybe that or maybe you can have the war in the Pacific without having the war in Europe, or I mean that if you never get Bolsheviks rising in Russia.

It's not that you get rid of the you know, the communist interest, because that was that was kind of large in Europe.

But well, if you never get that, that big communist supporter that was looking to export communism.

You get rid of, you get rid of the USSR as this enormous communist power.

That would be a much weaker Russia, certainly if they were forced to negotiate some sort of peace and idea, because.

There are seat also plays back to another one of those accidents of history or those moments of timing.

The Germans allowed Lenin to go back to Russia, specifically to let him organize the Bolshevik revolution.

And then you know, of course, largely the argument that Hitler makes for even though he had the initially the not aggression pack, but largely the argument that Hitler makes for everything Hitler's doing is to fight.

If he if they never give him a motorcycle and shoot him in the testicles, he probably never rises to power, right, I mean he is.

He is a product of the First World War.

You know, if you alter the way that that war plays out, that that might mean he not he doesn't he doesn't rise to power, and nothing exactly similar does.

If the Kaiser remains in power, you know, the into the thirties, it's hard to imagine that.

We see the way that the Nazi Party rises to power.

Yeah, yeah, I think if the Kaiser stays in power, if the Zar stays in power, if they if they transition sort of the way that England did into something more of a constitutional democracy.

And they're all interrelated.

And remember I mean they're all either you know, a grand son of or a grandchild of Victoria or the King of Sweden.

Between those two, they're all cousins.

And that if that group all stays together as buddy buddy as they transitioned into some other form of government, then yeah, certainly it's different.

It could very much be too that if the if a defeat is what forces the Czar to abandon the war in nineteen fifteen and his fleet is sunk and his army is defeated, Russia might become a minor power, not a major player in Europe.

Also a little funny since we talked about the Russo Japanese War in an earlier episode and Wilhelm Kaiser Wilhelm kind of encouraged Zar Nicholas to attack in the East with this idea that you know, they could like split the East between German and Russian and other Europeans spheres of influence, and that that ends up with some pretty major consequences for what happens in World War One, since things might have been a lot different if the Russian still had a large fleet.

As a counter argument to that, I honestly think that if Russia is able to make a exit stage left before they lose the million and a half to two million additional soldiers, and they do it at a time before the economy has collapsed, it is possible that the major players leading up to the period that we would consider be World War Two might have been Russia.

Russia still at that point, assuming that they do not give the same territorial concessions they gave at the Treaty of Resplotovsk, they keep the Ukraine essentially what they gave up, if you will, is Poland.

It is very possible that the Russia that comes out of the abbreviated World War One is actually in a better long term position, at which point, because Germany has won World War One and they've been able to impose a piece upon the allies.

At that point, the two superpowers are no longer France, Britain and the United States.

It's really it's Germany and Russia, and Britain and France are the secondary players.

They're the allies that Russia and Germany would be trying to play off against each other.

The game has always been, never allow Brittain, France and Russia to all ally at the same time, you know, France to alle.

You can allow Britain and Russia to allie, but you always have to have.

Well, it wasn't so much the alliance.

It was that the Kaiser managed to you know, take them all off.

So I mean they were more enemy of my enemy sort of thing.

But yeah, it's a fair point.

And we're talking about that million lost in the war, but I mean, what about that you know, the million who died in Ukraine as a result of the Russian Revolution, and you know all the destruction that came because of the Civil War that came afterwards too, So you're not just talking about you know, a million people, You're talking about millions of Russians who might not have died if there had been peace in nineteen fifteen.

Now they were still darn near peasants.

I mean, I mean they were still darn near you know, a feudal society.

How much can they change?

I don't know.

But one of the things that brought up for me, which I didn't really think about, is but if the war ends before the US enters the war, that really changes the US role on the world stage.

We're a very isolation nation at that point.

So doing World War One really really was the turning point in terms of the twentieth century and in terms of our ability to go involve ourselves in other wars.

And even then, you know, there was a lot of pushback for US getting involved in World War Two.

Definitely alters.

If you don't have a World War One and don't get a depression, then do you get an f do you get an FDR?

Yeah, since he really ran the power without the two world wars of the twentieth century, I mean, it's the USK more like a you know, like Canada, a you know, rather than we got the biggest navy in the world and we're going to stop around superpower?

Are we really just sort of a hey?

Oh?

I mean it's true though, that that's in terms of why the United States was the superpower of the twentieth century, it's it's because of what happens during those.

Two to those two wars, Yeah, and what the war happening, where the war ends before we even get there though.

Here's an interesting question there though, too.

If we don't enter the First World War, do we end up going to war with Mexico.

We're down near headed down that road of intervening in the Mexican Civil War when we're essentially distracted by the First World War.

I think that that's I think there's a real question there.

One of one of the things that had been at that point, Mexico's instability was beginning to I say beginning was causing real issues in the United States.

I mean, the whole reason why we constantly have, you know, these these attacks across the borders, because Mexico can't control anything.

But you know, Pershing was already you know, with the retribution.

Yeah, yeah, we already we were already stopping around Mexico with the army at that point.

Yeah.

So if we don't, if we never get into the First World Wars, you know, is Mexico the fifty first state or you know, the fifty for at least at least large chunks.

Yeah, do we intervene and what does that mean?

I mean, I don't necessarily mean that we would have conquered Mexico.

Another interesting question in America.

There was a large socialist movement in America at the time, and that socialist movement was largely killed by the First World War.

I feel, things like the Bisbee deportation and stuff like that.

It became seen as as unpatriotic to be a trade unionist as socialist.

So what if the Warrians of nineteen fifteen, the cizarre stays in power.

The Bolshevik Revolution doesn't occur in Moscow, it occurs in the United States.

And if we do, I mean, is it going to work the same way Russia did, where you know, we're going to be trying to export that revolution.

That's a stretch.

I think that there's some fundamental disconnects between American culture and Bolshevism that just doesn't work.

The United States has never embraced socialism to the same extent that anywhere with the rest.

Of I mean, we had unions that were set in fire and causing and they were very much socialists.

I mean, some of them, some of them very you know, you know, rank socialists, and we came up with excuses to shoot them.

But without the war, do we have the same excuses.

Yes, I think that it would largely come down to one of the two things.

Socialist movements.

I think that they tend to occur in economies that are fairly well developed but run into a major problem somewhere fits and starts socialism really is.

It begs back to the I cannot care for myself, I must have someone else do it.

Or the people cannot care for themselves, we must have someone else do it.

And that's against that really goes against the grain of the American individualist, and as we've seen with Teddy Roosevelt, that was still very much an important national characteristic, widely socially accepted and pretty much recognized by the rest of the world.

That, yeah, if you want an individ if you want, if you want so many things like an individual think like an American.

Would there be a stronger trade union movement without the war?

Very possibly?

So I do agree with that.

Yeah, it's even if you get a depression.

It's hard to imagine Roosevelt hanging out.

Four terms are being able to without without the Second World War.

Here's two other movements that are going on at the time that really suspend because of the First World War.

And so do we if we don't ender the First World War?

Do we get women's suffrage and prohibition earlier?

A decade earlier.

It's a fair it's it's a fair question because I mean, you're right with the with all of those movements, I mean, they stopped during World War One because everyone turned to we need to you know, we need to fight this war.

And once once we were in, we were in.

I think it's an interesting idea to talk about if we would get women's suffrage earlier and what that might have.

Been when it comes to nineteen if it to nineteen.

Yeah, ultimately, I think in a lot of ways, you know, what they might have changed, what the vote for women might have changed in lower you know, in lower positions.

Is interesting to see how that might have impacted the direction of the United States.

And I don't I don't know, that's that's I think it's hard to determine, but it feels like it would have it would have there would have been some impact there.

And temperance is an interesting one too.

Do do we get prohibition earlier and does that mean that prohibition last a shorter time or you know, is there at a different time, and how does that impact the growth of things like organized crime?

Yeah?

I mean I think if you get women suffrage five years earlier, you get prohibition five years earlier.

Was heavily women supported.

Yeah, and if you get if you get both of those five years earlier, it alters the face of American people?

Does so?

Does it just worked out the same way where but you get used to women voting and prohibition just doesn't work and we ended up getting rid of it?

Or do we?

I mean, could we still be a dry nation?

We probably without the First World War?

We probably get a whole different out of chief executives, right, No First World War?

No Second World though?

Are the no Truman, no Eisenhower?

You know, I mean, my goodness, almost everybody after after World War Two is yeah, yeah, by World War Two.

But I mean even even up into I mean, you know, H.

W.

Bush was a World War two veteran pilot in the World War two in the Pacific.

You know, if he doesn't have that have that experience, or it's different, does that impact whether or not he becomes president in the nineteen nineties.

Not to mention the fact that everything else would be different, you know.

Yeah, I mean, I mean, the bushes are probably still around, the candidates are probably still around, but yeah, yeah, they are they running for office.

I don't know, I mean, but you certainly lose.

I mean, Truman and Eisenhower were no way that they're in public office.

If it isn't for the for the war that the flu, that would I mean, the influenza grew out of the army camps of the First World War.

Does the world avoid the Great Influenza if if Russia leaves the war in nineteen fifteen.

There's another fair and interesting question.

There's so much about World War One that impacted how that disease spread too, because the fact that we didn't fight it the way we might have because of you know, war, see, because it really might not to mention, it probably wouldn't have been known as Spanish flu.

Yeah, well, yeah, that's true.

Yeah, But I mean I've got I've got an entire episode about how the war changed the flu and the food changed the war.

And without the war, but I mean, without the war, do you even get because the influenza probably starts in Kansas, it probably has spread through army camps.

If you don't have the army camps, do you even ever get the influenza?

How does that change the war the world?

If you don't have the great influence of the nineteen eighteen influenza, the questions become quite large, obviously, very very quickly.

So I mean not just for Russia and Germany, and not just for even the western front of the First World War, but for I mean the United States.

History is utterly altered if the war ends before we get there.

An interesting question that I think comes out of that, and that is, if the war ends early in nineteen fifteen, does that change the way that the League of Nations is accepted in the US?

My suspicion is the answer to that is no.

Wilson will push it, but isolation's forces within the United States, especially because there hasn't been.

It's a no blood, no foul.

I mean, if the war industry tween fifteen, do you get a Llegue of Nations?

I mean certainly not for the US.

Isn't end of the war because Wilson pushed that.

But if the war ends, does Wilson get reelected because he was literally reelected and he kept us out of war.

If you don't have the First and Second World War, do you ever get some version of the United Nations?

I think that you would probably get some sort of an international body that was dedicated to the to the lofty goals of peace and human development and you know, can we please just stop killing one another?

Well, it depends how much we kill each other, I mean, because the police stop killing one another.

Was these two war.

Back to possible situation?

In nineteen fifteen Russia side steps out of the war.

How does this affect the relations between a not quite so badly beaten down tsaist Russia and the emerging power of Japan.

Russia was kind of forced to give up what they wanted after the Russo Japanese War.

Yeah, so I can see that perhaps a Russia that recovers relatively quickly from a nineteen fifteen piece, and the people are frustrated because they have been defeated.

So perhaps Russia turns east to get and they begin eyeing.

Early early right before the First World War, Japan and Russia actually go to war, and Russia actually defeats Japan.

In a major battle, an important battle, and then it ends up they because of the non Aggression Pact, they're supposed to be friends down so they are like shake their heads.

But if there's no non aggression pact, if there's no Nazi Germany, then do Russia and Japan go to war?

You have a second Russo Japanese War.

Is it possible that it comes to a different outcome than the first Russo Japanese War?

Does that avoid the Sino Japanese War, which avoids the war on the Pacific?

If it goes the same way as the Russo Japanese War, does that give Japan even more power they sees, I mean quite honestly, the entire eastern eastern part of Russia.

Certainly they could have seized all through Kumchatka and stuff like that.

If they defeat Russia again, you know, just that that still could avoid the war in the Pacific, depending on how that impacts Japanese.

Yeah, they might not have too much interest in China if they've taken all of eastern Russia.

So imagine if Japan, if Japan was you know, all the way the entire eastern side of Russia from Siberia East is actually all Japan, And does Japan militarize the way that it did before the Second World War?

Because I mean they were actually pretty pretty darn democratic and you know, they were on the side the Japanese submarines actually patrolled in the Mediterranean during the First World War.

So I mean, how how how does that change that?

Again, that radically alters the entire map.

What if?

What if?

What if China is dominated by Japan?

Or what if Russia wins and dominates China and you know, non a non bolshit a Russia.

I mean, so do you get the communists in China if Russia is as or Japan is dominating China exactly?

Here's another here's another wrinkle to throw in because at that point France and Britain had been defeated.

What happens with Japanese territorial ambitions to places like say Singapore.

Well, I mean they're not necessarily defeated in this.

It might be just that just with Russia out of the war, Germany says, oh no, I don't, no, fowl, we don't have to fight here.

Yeah, you're right.

I mean, does Japan have more territorial success or does does Germany keep its territories in the Pacific because I lose all Yeah, because of course they by the time nineteen fifteen, even by the Battle of the the Gulf of Riga, they've already lost all those because Japan essentially is you know, that's in nineteen fourteen and early nineteen fifteen, they've they've seized all that.

You know.

By World War two, there's there's no German.

Yeah, there's no German yeah, yeah, not anymore at all.

In I mean, by either of these scenarios, either by Germany defeating the Allies on the on the on the western side, the on top of the Western side, or by a negotiated peace, there's a very good chance that Germany keeps those colonies.

Right, Yeah, let's let's end the war, give me back the you know, the Bismarck Archipelago, though, I mean, you can't keep anything that you took.

Who knows, but it might change, It might leave Germany as a power in the Pacific, and you know, that might complicate if Japan starts getting more militaristic later on.

So instead of the Second World War, which you have is the Great Pacific War, where essentially Australia Germany and the United States are opposing Japan that has half of Russia.

That's that's agility.

My point was is that a lot of the nationalist movements arise because of the perceived defeat of the powers that we're controlling the territories.

For instance, you can't see independent Baltic states.

If Germany outright wins and occupies the ball Altics or vice versa, the Russian Empire does not fall.

Those independence movements simply don't occur.

If you haven't.

If you have an undefeated Germany and an undefeated Russia without the Revolution and the Baltic you know, the Austro Hungarian Empire just collapses.

It makes Germany and Russia the do you do?

You end up with a war there anyway over all the territorists, and maybe that would be a German, Italian, Russian, Turkish war over the stuff Turkey can't hold on to and the you know, all the Balkans.

But because none of any powers that we're going to come out of the collapse of the Austro Hungarian Empire, we're going to have a difficult time.

You know, Germany definitely would have been the major power in Central Europe without if they they were able to survive the First World War.

Yeah, and they probably take good chunks of the Austro Hungarian Empire, I mean, and probably parts of that will become part of the German you know, come to a.

But pieces of it that were going to absorbed into the Nazi Empire, like Ostria, Czechoslovakia and Austria and places like that.

I mean, certainly we're altering the map of Europe on that.

But I mean, this is Germany going to go after Serbia.

I mean, it's certainly going to have an interest all the way down and say, you know, Serbia, Montenegro, that sort of stuff down there.

I don't know.

If Russia is not defeated, then you have to think that Russia is going to continue to have an interest in the Slavic States.

We know that Italy has an interest there, and of course we know that the Ottomans still have an interest there.

There's also the reality that if Austra or excuse me, if the Turkish Empire is able to hold together, we do not get the fractured Middle East that we have currently, or perhaps if there were national movements they would organize a lot more organic lines as opposed to line strong on the map by Western powers.

Well, without a First twelve War, that you end up with the Palestine, the Palestine mandate in the State of Israel.

I mean, it's if you don't have the Holocaust of the Second World War, then you don't get the same international impetus for a Jewish homeland.

So I mean there's still going to be Yeah, you don't, I mean so yeah.

So, I mean that's that's a very radically different world than we're understanding today.

When we're talking about this.

We're going back.

We've gone so far afield.

But it's interesting to talk about a part of the war of World War One that we so often just ignore and to say that it was it was possibly vital enough to have altered the entire face of world history since.

And that's I mean, I think that's one of the cool things about these counterfactuals that we've been able to do.

And I think we've learned lots of lesson and from the different ones we've done, from only how big a change, how small a change.

It's interesting because the last one we were doing is about the Civil War, and that we were arguing since my eighteen sixty four were kind of again, now you can't change much, but I mean here, I mean if if the Russian Navy's defeated, then that certainly means other losses for Russia on the land in nineteen fifteen, which if anything, is going to hasten Russia leaving the war, and even a few months of Russia leaving the war can make a different outcome.

What if the German defensives, I mean, what if it doesn't end in nineteen fifteen, but the German defenses of nineteen eighteen are able to be presented in a different way because you don't have the imperative of the US enter the war.

What if they come in nineteen seventeen and what if they defeat?

What if they push written off the continent and Britain seeks a separate peace, they defeat both allies there?

What if they bankrupt Britain?

Those are all very realistic possibilities of even a few months change of when Russia's out of the war.

So yeah, certainly here this I mean this in terms of counterfactuals.

This for a battle, I would suspect that not one in one hundred people were aware that there was a naval battle called the Battle the Gulf of Riga between the German IC's Fleet and the Russian Imperial to the First World War.

But that this battle that you probably never even heard of, this really could have been a drastic culteration in history.

If it doesn't knock Russia out of the war, it puts the Baltics into the German sphere of influence at the end of World War One.

If the Baltics are removed from the Soviet sphere of influence leading up to an alternate timeline where things ended up kind of as they did but not exactly, and the state of Poland did not get reconstituted in the way that they did.

What does that look like for Germany and the Soviet Union during this alternate World War Two?

What does that look like?

So if the First World War ends on a more of we're all tired, we're going to end the war, rather than a complete capitulation by Germany, and so that Germany takes at at least keeps much of what they've gone there in Eastern Europe, I mean World War two, it's not just fought over the results of the First World War, but it is literally fought over Poland and Czechoslovakia and you know, German expansionism over territories that might have stuck with Germany.

I would say that Stalin does he consider invading Poland or even in our alternate timeline, you know, grabbing that piece of Central Europe that used to be Poland?

Does he do that if the Germans have a strong ally and presence in the Baltic.

Because I think Stalin wants to he wants to exupport revolution there at the and that point, actually it's it's Lenin.

But but I mean they're thinking if we you know, if we can knock one European capital to to to socialism, that they're all going to fall like Dominos.

That's kind of was the thinking that was going on then.

But you're right if they're I mean, if he's looking at a German state that he's terrified of, uh you know that maybe not.

I mean, you know, the reason for the non aggression pack was was not because Stalin like Hitler or you know, Stalin just knew he wasn't prepared for war.

So I mean, does it does it does it always prevent a war?

Or does you know, does does Hitler still rise this fascism still rise, you know, who knows, But I mean Germany is still going to feel threatened by Bolsheviks on the border, whether they're an imperial state or whether they're a fascist state.

Right, whatever Germany you get, you have to think that they might turn militaristic towards Russia, even if Rush is afraid of them, If Poland and Eastern Europe, Techloslovakia and maybe Ukraine, if that all ends up in German hands, I mean, does Russia even really have a chance if Germany decides turned against them.

Yeah, And I think that due to that large change of hands of territory that you inevitably have another Second World War as we have seen.

I don't think that that we were ever going to get out of the twentieth century with just one major dust up that involved pretty much the entire world.

Well, I mean, because you've got all the nationalist movements, all the anti colonial colonialism movements that are going on, You've got different intellectual movements that are going on.

It's way to say that, but I can certainly see a scenario where Russia and Germany go at it in France and Britain to stay out, or that they are maybe more likely to join Germany in that depending on how the war ended, the First World War ended, because they're probably more scared of Bolshevism than they are, especially if the Kaiser is still in power.

Right.

The other question is, you know, how does the how does the Russian Civil War work out?

With a Germany that is not effectively disarmed?

Are they going to allow Bolshevist to run amok in Karelia, which is right next door to the Baltic States.

It's a fair question if if there's still a Russian you know, a fight between between reds and whites, but a but a you know, the Kaiser is still in power in Germany?

Does that you know, the the reaction against uh, you know, overthrowing the monarchies was pretty strong, and so monarch power in Germany could quite easily as as silly as it might sound for them to have just been fighting a war and then suddenly Germany be, you know, trying to fight with the czars.

And I don't think that's actually all that.

I mean that they actually might they might join with bizarre against Bolshevism.

Yeah, if they weren't, if they weren't at war, Yeah, that that is an interesting idea to hear, though.

You know that Russia and Germany are at war, and then the Bolsheviks start rising, and all of a sudden, you know, the Czar and the Kaiser agreed, we're gonna stop playing, We're gonna both put down the Bolsheviks.

But it certainly, it certainly doesn't seem impossible.

I mean, you know, one of the reasons the the the Civil War goes the way it does is because, you know, everyone who wanted the monarchists, the whites to win that was all busy doing something else.

So even when we had there was there was quite a lot of intervention, but no one could intervene with the forces they might have wanted to because, of course, at that point, Germany didn't want to open up a second front, which was a large part of the reason why everybody else intervened was the hope that they could reopen that second front.

I can't I can't imagine that America is going to be sending into the Russian Revolution if we never entered the First World War.

Yeah, definitely not because of that.

Basically, the reason that the United States center is the First War was due to unrestricted summary warfare if Germany is doing relatively well, it does not take the Hail Mary of hey, let's try to cause British economic collapse by pissing off the rest of the world that isn't actively with us.

Yeah, I don't think that America takes that step, and ultimately that keeps America out of some entanglements, and obviously that has some that has ramifications for the future.

Here's another odd one, and it's maybe less likely, but I mean, there was a large movement to support Germany in the United States.

It was really we're kind of on a nice knife edge over which side we're going to support.

So if there are major German victories in nineteen fifteen that shift the balance of power in the war earlier, I mean, do we we end up supporting Germany in that war?

I mean, I don't know that we would enter some troops on the side of Germany, But I mean we're making this choice where we're saying, ah, you know, the mind, the mind barrage, that's fine, but unrestricted naval warfare that's terrible.

I mean, we see that contradicted in there, because Britain was doing exactly what Germany was doing.

So what if we instead are vilifying the British for their mind warfare and putting Britain in a in a position where they're the ones that have to either mitigate their policy of embargo of Germany or face war with the United States.

It's not as foregone as I think we we think we sometimes think when we look back at the past, the idea that we were definitely going to support, you know, England and France as opposed to Germany.

And I think that's part of what's interesting about our counterfactuals is that we kind of get this idea that there's a weight to history that makes history happen the way it does.

And it's interesting that when you look closer, you see that that that weight could swing wildly.

And I don't know, because I don't think it was forgotten that we supported England, and it ultimately did come down to it.

You know, if the Germans hadn't started restarted unrestricted submarine warfare, that would have impacted when the United States entered the war, and it all came down to, you know, which side had to do what.

When, Yeah, we didn't.

We didn't even have to go to war.

We simply had to tell England, if you don't stop interdicting our trade with Germany, will threaten war.

I mean that puts Germany written in a very different position.

So just the threat of that possibility would have would have impacted how they how they behave.

And you're right, I mean, if if England has to if change that, how does that impact Germany's embargo And if they're able to more you know, bring more in through that embargo because England has to alter their their policy, then that, I mean certain that has an impact.

And that's quite aside from the fact that that that might mean, you know, a million American troops don't show up to support the to.

Support Yeah, they're the on top powers.

Well, and we were also, I mean we were given them arms like crazy, We were going to explosives like crazy because we were, you know, we essentially siding with them before we sided with him.

Could could that have been altered if the Russian fleet had been defeated in nineteen fifteen and that led to significant German victories early in the war.

And I guess I'm not sure if I have enough of an idea on what the pulse of the American public in that period, but I.

Mean, there was definitely there was definitely a lot of There was definitely a lot of support for Germany.

It would how would it would have shifted enough just from seeing German victories in the field?

I mean, were we picking that because of who we thought in the war?

That's that's that's that's a hard one, but I mean it's it is we really were.

I mean, we were operating by a double standard when we vilified Germany for submary warfare and we didn't give the same reaction to the to the mining warfare.

A lot of people will argue that this was a banker's war, that the bankers wanted us to go to war, and they were trying to drag us into war, and did they have a particular reason why they wanted to drag us into the war on the side of the Entente as opposed to the side of the of the of the central powers.

In a rather cynical observation, but one that tends to hold up when you look at this through the through the lens of history, and that is that the United States I think supported Britain in France largely because they were easy to reach trading partners that we wouldn't have had to fight through a hostile navy to get through.

I think it's a hard I think it's a hard nut to crack to say that the United States was ever going to enter war on the side of Germany.

Now you know, and then you know, forcing the blockade.

I don't think that an isolationist America wanted to take that step, which would antagonize the British to the point where you might have gotten a British conflict.

I think that the United States was perfectly happy to go with the path of least resistance and have trading partners and support nations that we had we had had.

There's a lot of German dissilia in the United States at the time, So I mean it's interesting because it really wasn't.

I mean, we weren't closer on the edge between who we were going to signe with in that war than it appears.

I don't know if something happening on the on the Russian front of the First World War could have changed American attitudes or at all, but I mean, it's it's interesting.

It might have also just pushed our isolationism more.

And of course, if we don't end the war then there's a very good chance that the that the on top powers.

I've had people try to argue, oh, the war was already over before there was into the world, the first worl War.

That's nonsense.

Prince in Britain were on the verge of collapse.

Yeah, French troops were open.

Britain was on the verge of bankruptcy.

Yeah.

The Germans basically by not being able to see that that would have been one of those Folkroum points where a very very tiny change made a huge difference.

Yeah.

The Yeah, the Germans could get driven.

That that that the ten miles where the French ships just walked off the line.

If Germany had been prepared to exploit that immediately, yeah, then Frances could have been knocked out of the war to day.

Yeah.

I mean they were very close to Paris.

Yah.

I mean, let's say, you know, Russia gets knocked out of the war, Germany goes to France and Britain and says, that was really the reason we were fighting the war, right, so we don't have to fight a war anymore.

How about the three of us get together like we always did, and we divide up the Balkans, you know, that's I mean, they could have just had another meeting where they sat and divided up the part.

That is the same way Poland was eliminated to begin with, right, And I think they may you know, have been dargwell happy to do that.

I mean, I think it's quite possible that France and Britain would have happily sat down with Germany to see what they're going to take from uh, you know, a defeated Russia, you know, uh Autumn Empire collapsing us to Hungarian Empire.

You know.

One of the arguments we when you even get into counterfactuals, and it's one of the arguments against the great man theory too, it's just to say that the events are really bigger than any you know, small you know thing.

So it might be that the nature of a first and second World War would be different.

There might be who was allied with who in a first and second World might be different.

It might be that we have different names of you know, great people that rose and had huge impacts of it.

But I mean, in the end, the broader themes that you know, the coming depression, the end of imperialism, you know, great devastating wars that alter our tire understanding, you know, because the wars of the sixteenth century in the seventeenth century led to, you know, the enlightenment of the eighteenth century, so that you know, the United Nations that came out of the First and Second World War, maybe that was inevitable globalism.

And so I mean you could also just go back to, you know, how much would things change if this one battle in the Baltic had been lost, and you could we could argue all sorts of ways where it might have been.

I mean, you can also say probably not much, because events were bigger than this.

Events were simply bigger than the Imperial fleet.

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