Every bank CFO runs the same calculation before rejecting A2A.

€7.77 billion in card volume at 0.6% is €47 million in revenue. Shift 30% to A2A at 0.5% and you earn €11.7 million on it, but you lose €14 million of card revenue. Net: minus €2.3 million.

The arithmetic is flawless. The conclusion is wrong, because the model counts what you lose and not what you stop losing.

It holds everything constant except the rate. Same merchants, same volume, lower margin, therefore loss. That is a clean calculation of a world that does not exist. In the real one, mid-sized European banks lose 10-15% of their merchants every year to competitors who price lower, and the trend is accelerating. That volume is leaving whether or not you launch A2A.

With A2A as differentiation, churn drops to 4-5%. That is €7-8 million a year of revenue that simply stops walking out, and it appears nowhere in the cannibalization model because churn is invisible until it has already happened.

Then the lines that follow. New merchants won on a differentiated proposition: €4-5 million. Volume growth of 8-12% as merchants pass savings to customers. Cross-sell into treasury and lending on a deeper relationship: €3-4 million.

Complete picture: plus €20.2 million, not minus €2.3 million.

Full episode for the five-year model year by year, the segmentation that protects high-margin merchants, and the five mistakes that turn a transition into a revenue crisis.

Full source material and the complete guide: https://go.payware.eu/p-card-to-a2a-b

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AI-generated from payware's published research and documentation.